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Abstract1— Cyber security experts in the U.S. and around the 
globe assess potential threats to their organizations by evaluating 
potential attackers’ skills, knowledge, resources, access to the 
target organization and motivation to offend (i.e. SKRAM). 
Unfortunately, this model fails to incorporate insights regarding 
online offenders’ traits and the conditions surrounding the 
development of online criminal event. Drawing on contemporary 
criminological models, we present a theoretical rationale for 
revising the SKRAM model. The revised model suggests that in 
addition to the classical SKRAM components, both individual 
attributes and certain offline and online circumstances fuel cyber 
attackers’ motivation to offend, and increase the probability that 
a cyber-attack will be launched against an organization. 
Consistent with our proposed model, and its potential in 
predicting the occurrence of different types of cyber-dependent 
crimes against organizations, we propose that Information 
Technology professionals’ efforts to facilitate safe computing 
environments should design new approaches for collecting 
indicators regarding attackers’ potential threat, and predicting 
the occurrence and timing of cyber-dependent crimes. 
Keywords— Hackers, Cyber-Dependent Crime 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Computers and computer-networks (i.e. an interconnected 
collection of autonomous computers that allow an easy 
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exchange of information between users) [1] have become an 
integral part of American industry, business and government. 
Their efficient operation is increasingly critical to the survival 
of the USA and its organizations [2]. However, next to 
supporting legitimate business activities and facilitating 
opportunities to interact with employees, clients and vendors, 
the heavy reliance of large organizations on computers and 
computer networks increases their vulnerability to a wide range 
of cyber-dependent crimes (i.e. all these crimes that emerge as 
a direct result of computer technology and the internet and that 
could not exist without it) [3,4]. Indeed, numerous reports 
suggest that large corporations and governmental agencies 
experience a wide range of computer focused crimes including 
system-trespassing (or hacking), website defacement, 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, and malicious 
software infections [5-7], with an estimated $400 bilion annual 
cost to the global economy from these crimes [8].  
To deal with these new and increasing threats and facilitate 
more secure computing environments, CISOs in large 
organizations and their teams evaluate the threats to their 
organizations periodically and ensure that their organizations 
apply up-to-date security solutions that are designed to prevent, 
detect, and mitigate malicious cyber activities [9]. However, 
these efforts fall short in predicting the type and timing of an 
attack against an organization due to the difficulties involved in 
collecting and analyzing reliable information about hacker 
groups, their intentions, and tools to develop meaningful 
indications and warnings of potential attacks. As a result, 
information technology teams are required to employ  scattered 
security solutions, and only rarely focus attention on concrete 
and viable threats. This is unfortunate since although online 
criminals consistently look for opportunities to attack potential 
targets, attacks against either target of opportunity or targets of 
choice are launched only under specific set of conditions and 
circumstnaces. Therefore, we propose that a successful 
organizational cyber security strategy should draw on deep 
understanding of how conditions conducive to cyber-attacks 
evolve, as well as awareness to both online and offline 
circumstances that increase online-offenders’ situational 
motivation to offend. Adopting such an approach for cyber 
security requires the development and implementation of new 
tools that allow the collection and analysis of information 
about online criminals and the concrete emerging threats they 
pose to an organization in real time. Below, we outline the 
theoretical rationale that supports the suggested approach.    
II. ASSESSING ATTACKERS’ POTENTIAL THREAT TO AN 
ORGANIZATION 
The growing number of victims of cyber dependent crimes 
in the U.S. and around the world, as well as the wide variation 
in victims’ demographic characteristics (ranging from large 
organizations to private individuals), encouraged scientific 
explorations around cyber-criminals and their operations 
against online targets. Those investigations yielded several 
hackers typologies that mainly differentiate between hackers’ 
level of malicious intents (for instance white, black and grey 
hackers [10]), skill levels (i.e. low, mid and high [11, 12]), and 
motivation to launch a cyber attack (for instance, thrill, 
monetary gain, revenge, recreation, ideology and exploration) 
[13]. Consistent with these typologies, Parker [14] developed a 
model for assessing attackers’ (both individuals and groups) 
potential threat to organizational information systems. 
Specifically, Parker suggested that when considering the 
implementation of new cyber-security strategies in an 
organization, information security professionals should assess 
five key elements in the potential profile of those who may be 
interested in launching attacks against the organizations, and 
address these elements accordingly. The five elements are 
Skills, Knowledge, Resources, Authority and Motivations (i.e. 
SKRAM). Skills pertains to potential offenders’ aptitude, 
expertise and competency to launch particular cyber-dependent 
crimes. Knowledge refers to offenders’ familiarity with facts 
about different attack methods and tools, as well as 
understanding of information systems that are used by potential 
targets. Both skills and knowledge could be acquired by online 
offenders over time through either informal or formal training 
and collaboration. Resources refers to offenders’ access to 
means like time, money, hardware, software and other types of 
technologies which enable them to initiate cyber-dependent 
crimes. Authority pertains to offenders’ access to facilities or 
information systems. And finally, motives refer to the 
underlying reasons behind online offenders’ involvement in 
online crime. Indeed, online offenders’ motives to engage in 
wide range of cyber-dependent crimes may vary quite a bit, 
and include a desire to explore computer technology, the thrill 
of engaging in illegal activities, revenge, ideology, and/or 
monetary gain. Importantly, Parker [14] suggests that 
offenders’ motives could determine the identity of potential 
victims, in addition to the methods and tools that will be used 
by online offenders to launch a cyber-dependent crime event. 
Reffering to the interaction between these five key elements, 
Parker proposes that online offender’s potential SKRAM can 
increase over time to become a greater threat to a target. 
Moreover, the threat potential imposed by multiple online 
offenders and online crime groups increases substantially 
through synergistic activities, and in turn, increases the threat 
potential for the organization.   
Parker’s model has served as an important guideline to 
Information Technology officers, security professionals, law 
enforcement investigators and policy makers who aim to 
identify the risk of cyber-dependent crimes against 
organizations and build more effective security policies and 
defense systems against different type of hackers [15]. 
However, although useful in identifying potential online risks 
to organizations, the model carries two main problems. First, it 
does not take into consideration individual level factors that are 
known to be antecedents of individual involvement in deviance 
and crime. Specifically, extensive criminological research 
suggests that various demographic charactaristics and 
personality traits are key predictors for influencing individuals’ 
decision to initiate a criminal event [16-17]. Second, this model 
(like many other recent typologies (for instance [18]) 
elaborates factors like revenge, monetary gain, obsession and 
thrill seeking as key motivations for individuals online offend. 
By doing so, it seems like Parker adopts [19] defenition of 
individual motivation to launch a cyebr attack as both the 
reasons for individuals engagement in cyber-dependent crimes 
as well as the measure of the degree to which the attack will 
repeat. However, the common premise among modern 
criminologists suggests  that individuals’ needs and values 
cannot explain individuals’ involvement in crime since the 
same needs and values could be obtained through non-criminal 
behaviors [20]. Accordingly, monetary gain, revenge or thrill 
seeking are not obtained solely through involvement in crime. 
In fact, individuals who pursue a normative lifestyle may end 
up obtaining financial gain, revenge or excitement by simply 
pursuing legitimate life style (for instance attending school, 
working for a respectable company or going on an exciting 
trip). Therefore, these desires and goals cannot explain 
individuals’ involvement in crime, and should not be confused 
with one’s motivation to offend. Instead, extensive 
criminological literature suggests that individual’s motivation 
to offend comes either from within [21], and/or from the 
environment [22-23].  We believe that this theoretical 
elaboration could be of interest to information technology and 
network security teams in organizations since it factors in 
valuable information that could predict the occurrence, types 
and timing of cyber-dependent crimes against organizations.    
III. THE MOTIVATION TO OFFEND IN THE CRIMINOLOGICAL 
LITERATURE  
In general, criminologists who seek to understand the 
etiology of crime emphasize two approaches that explain 
individual motivation to offend. The first suggests that the 
motivation and the drive to offend originate in an individual’s 
psychology and personality traits, while the second approach 
emphasizes environmental cues as key for the development of 
the motivation to offend. Criminological explanations that 
focus on individual attributes and internal processes as key 
factors that determine an individual’s involvement in crime 
highlight the role of decision-making processes [24], weak 
self-control [25], and the absence of coping mechanisms that 
allow individuals to handle with negative emotions in a 
legitimate way [26]. In contrast, criminological models that 
perceive the motivation to offend as originated in the 
environment, emphasize the role of socialization and learning 
[20, 23], as well as of situations conducive to crime [22] in 
increasing individual’s motivation to initiate a criminal event. 
We briefly detail the underlying assumptions of these key 
criminological models, and link them to individual’s 
probability to launch cyber-dependent crimes.   
A. Individual based explanations of crime  
Rational Choice and Deterrence- Rational choice models 
assume that human beings are rational, self-interested actors 
who seek to minimize personal cost while maximizing personal 
gain [24,27]. An important implication of such perspectives in 
the context of criminal behaviors is that individual behavior 
can be altered by the threat and imposition of punishment as 
well as the availability of rewards. While early work on 
rational choice emphasized the role of sanctions in deterring 
individuals from engaging in crime [28], contemporary 
scholars discuss the relationships between various aspects of 
sanctioning (for instance formal vs informal) and individual 
deviant outcomes. 
Clarke and Cornish’s [29] extension of the rational choice 
theory emphasizes the need to understand criminals’ decision-
making processes in the contexts of their lifestyles, experiences 
and situations they encounter. According to these scholars, 
criminal decision-making takes place within social, physical 
and situational contexts that shape offenders’ perception of the 
world around them [29]. Thus, individuals’ assessment of costs 
and benefits are subjective and bounded. Accordingly, under 
certain circumstances, risks that once deterred criminals are no 
longer effective and deterring, and rewards that were 
previously ignored become extremely attractive [30]. Applying 
Clarke and Cornish’s rational in the context of cyber-
dependent crimes, we argue that when potential rewards for 
launching a cyber-dependent crime outweigh potential costs, 
cyber-criminals will be more likely to launch a criminal event 
[31-33].  
Weak Self-Control- Following the classical criminological 
tradition, Gottfredson and Hirschi [25] perceive criminal 
behavior as a consequence of the variably restrained human 
tendency to seek pleasure and avoid pain. In line with this 
view, these authors suggest that the tendency toward crime and 
deviance can be explained by an individual’s level of self-
control.  Those lacking self-control are characterized as 
impulsive, insensitive, physical, risk seeking, short-sighted and 
nonverbal. In their seminal work, Gottfredson and Hirschi view 
individuals with low levels of self-control as unable to resist 
temptations, and as prone to act on criminal opportunities to 
engage in crime. In line with this theoretical model, we suspect 
that low self-control individuals are more likely to take 
advantage of online opportunities to engage in cyber-dependent 
crimes and launch cyber dependent criminal events then low 
self-control individuals [36].     
Strain, Frustration and Crime- Agnew’s General Strain 
Theory [26] stresses that an individual’s experiences of strains 
such as blocked goals, the removal of valued stimuli, or the 
imposition of negative stimuli may provoke negative emotions 
such as anger and frustrations, which in turn, could motivate 
individuals’ use of deviant behavior to deal with the negativity. 
Agnew assumes that strain is unpleasant and may upset an 
emotional equilibrium, so a strained individual will try to do 
something to alleviate the strain or correct the emotional 
disequilibrium that it creates. Most of the time, and for most 
people, strain produces conventional cognitive or non-deviant 
behavioral and emotional coping. However, sometimes, and 
under some conditions, strain leads to deviant behavior or 
unconventional, although not necessarily deviant, coping. 
Agnew details aspects of strain that enhance the likelihood of 
leading to deviant adaptations. He focuses particularly on 
cumulatively and the ratio of negative to positive factors, but 
he also notes the importance of the magnitude, recency, 
duration and clustering of stress inducing situations. Moreover, 
strains that are more likely to result in crime are strains that 
seen as unjust, are seen as high in magnitude, are associated 
with low social control and create some pressure or incentive 
to engage in crime (Agnew 2002). Consistent with the General 
Strain perspective, we propose that negative experiences 
increase cyber criminals’ negative emotions, and in the absence 
of legitimate coping skills, increase their likelihood to launch 
cyber-dependent crimes.  
B. Environmental based explanations of crime  
Learning To Be a Criminal- The social learning theory 
[34] has its underpinnings in the psychological literature, and 
suggests that individuals learn how to become criminals from 
their social environment. Specifically, this theory proposes that 
excessive exposure to definitions favorable towards violating 
the law over definitions that are unfavorable towards the 
violations of laws, is the underlying cause for individuals’ 
adoption of a criminal lifestyle and involvement in deviance 
and crime. According to this theory, the learning process 
involves the learning of motivations (i.e. rationalizations for 
the act) and techniques (i.e. skills and tools), and draws on the 
balance of anticipated rewards and punishments for engaging 
in a criminal behavior. All in all, past criminological research 
has already found support for the key theoretical assumption of 
social learning theory in the context of computer hacking. 
Specifically, several studies reported that hackers maintain peer 
relationships with other hackers [35] and that peer associations 
are important for introducing new hackers to both hacking 
tools and methods [36].  
Situations Conducive to Online Crime- Briar and Piliavin 
[22] suggested that all people are capable of deviant and 
exhibit criminal behaviors under the right circumstances. 
Specifically, according to these theoreticians, situationally 
induced stimuli of relatively short duration can influence 
individuals’ values and behaviors in such a way that will lead 
to a decision to engage in illegal behaviors, independent of 
their personality traits and commitment to conformity.  
Drawing on Briar and Piliavin’s claims, and emphasizing the 
centrality of offenders’ decision-making processes in 
determining involvement in deviance and crime, Clarke 
differentiates (1995) between individual decisions to become 
involved in crime (i.e. criminal involvement) and decisions to 
become involved in a particular crime (i.e. criminal event). 
According to Clarke, individuals first decide whether they are 
willing to become involved in crime. This decision is largely 
influenced by past learning and experiences (including moral 
code) and a range of background characteristics (demographic 
and social)[37]. Once the choice to get involved in crime is 
made, individuals need to decide to commit particular offenses. 
This decision is largely determined by the immediate situations 
individuals encounter. Importantly, Clarke acknowledges the 
prevalence of situations conducive to crime in the life of most 
people, and the commission of risky behaviors and illegal acts 
by both “ordinary citizens” and “hardened offenders.” 
Incorporating this insight with the notion that the decision to 
initiate a risky behavior is induced by the absence of moral 
opprobrium attached to criminal opportunities, Clarke contends 
that offenses like trespassing and theft may be effectively 
prevented by increasing the pressure to comply with the law. In 
the absence of such pressure, situations conduce to crime will 
emerge, and increase the probability of individuals to initiate 
criminal events. Thus, consistent with the underlying premise 
of situational explanations of crime we posit that the 
emergence of situations conducive to online crime increase 
cyber-criminals’ probability to launch a cyber-dependent crime 
event.  
IV. REVISED SKRAM (DSK-RAMG) MODEL  
Based on the rationale discussed in these criminological 
models, we propose a revision to Parker’s SKRAM [14]. 
Specifically, although we acknowledge the necessity to 
consider cybercriminals’ skills, knowledge, resources, 
authority and motivation for predicting organizational risks of 
cyber-dependent crimes, we suggest refining the concept of 
motivation, and adding two additional predictive elements for 
assessing organizations’ potential risks from cyber-criminals: 
online offenders’ demographic and personal attributes and 
goals (i.e. DSK-RAMG). We believe that revision of this 
model could prove useful in improving Information 
Technology managers’ efforts to assess the risk posed to their 
organizations by range of cyber criminals. 
A. Attackers’ demographic and personality traits.  
Parker’s model fails to account for online criminals 
individuals traits as a potential risk factors to organizations 
cyber security. However, several psychological and 
criminological studies identify individual’s demographic and 
personality attributes that are associated with cyber-dependent 
criminals. For instance, [38] report that hackers tend to be 
male, obsessive and explorers. [12] profiles hackers as young, 
intelligent, and loners. Hackers are also reported to come from 
middle class status, have poor social and communication skills, 
low self-esteem, and a strong desire to succeed [39]. Bossler 
and Burruss [36] find that computer hackers are likely to have 
lower levels of self-control. Finally, Young and associates [40] 
demonstrate that computer hackers employ rational decision 
making process before engaging in cybercrime by perceiving 
high utility value from hacking, little informal sanctions, and a 
low likelihood of punishment. Moreover, these scholars report 
that computer hackers tend to exhibit high levels of moral 
disengagement.  
Drawing on these studies, and the criminological school of 
thought that ties individual’s personality traits with the 
probability to offend, we suspect that knowledge regarding 
cyber-dependent criminals’ demographic and personality traits 
could be useful in predicting the occurrence, type and timing of 
cyber-dependent crime against specific organizations. For 
instance, we suspect that highly impulsive cyber-criminal will 
be more likely to launch cyber-dependent crimes against 
organization of interest than cyber criminals who are only 
slightly impulsive [36]. Moreover, impulsive online criminals 
are more likely to initiate higher volume and types of cyber-
dependent crimes. Similarly, we suspect that online offenders 
with lower levels of Thoutfully Reflective Decision Making 
(TRDM) [41] may be more volatile against less sophisticated 
targets, and less effective in generating well thought and cyber-
dependent crimes against large organizations.  
B. Situational motivation to launch a cyber event  
Next to the role of personality, we emphasize the role of 
situational motivation for increasing online offenders’ 
potential risk to launch cyber-dependent crimes against large 
organizations. All in all, Cornish and Clarke [42] identify five 
broad situations conducive to the development of offline 
criminal events. The first are any circumstances under which 
offenders need to invest relatively low amount of effort for 
initiating crime (for instance the absence of locks on doors). 
The second are situations in which the risk of getting caught 
and punished are low (for instance the absence of security 
guards and CCTV cameras in public places). The third type of 
circumstances are situations in which the potential rewards 
from the criminal event are relatively high (for instance 
expensive piece of jewelry). The fourth type of situations 
conducive to crimes are situations that increase individual 
emotional arousals (for instance disputes). Finally, the last set 
of situations conducive to crime are all these situations in 
which offenders can excuse and justify their involvement in 
crime (for instance the lack of behavioral rules in a public 
park).  
Translating these situations to the online environment, one 
can identify a wide range of both offline and online situations 
that could increase online offenders’ situational motivation to 
launch cyber-dependent crimes. For instance, knowledge 
regarding computer vulnerabilities reduce online offenders’ 
efforts to break security on a system, and in turn, increase the 
probability they will try to gain an illegitimate access to 
organizational computers [43]. The availability of unencrypted 
data as well we the absence of surveillance on either a 
computer or computer network, reduce online offenders risk 
of detection and punishment, and in turn increase their 
probability to launch cyber dependent crimes [44]. The 
emergence of online black markets and hackers’ forums over 
the dark net increase online offenders’ potential rewards from 
engaging in online crimes, and in turn, increase the situational 
motivation to launch cyber-dependent crime events [45]. 
Political events like wars and military provocations, may 
increase potential online offenders anger and frustrations, and 
in turn, increase their situational motivation to launch a cyber-
dependent crime against rival political entities (for instance 
the alleged cyber-attacks initiated by Russia on Estonian 
organization for several days in response to the relocation of a 
Soviet-era grave marker (i.e. the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn) in 
Tallinn, Estonia [46]). Finally, the absence of clear guidelines 
with respect to the appropriate ways to use computing 
environment may increase individual’s potential for justifying 
an online criminal event and result in the development of a 
cyber-dependent crime.  
C. Attackers’ Goals.  
We believe that understanding cyber-criminals’ goals in 
launching cyber-dependent crimes against an organization 
could improve security officials’ assessments of potential 
cyber-risks to their organizations. Specifically, we suspect that 
online criminals’ goals in launching cyber-dependent events 
could range from a desire to explore computer technology, the 
thrill of engaging in illegal activities, willingness to gain 
prestige among peers, revenge, obsession, ideology, or 
monetary gain [13]. Moreover, it is possible that cyber-
criminals are willing to engage in online criminal behaviors in 
order to obtain more than just one goal. Importantly, previous 
works have already identified these goals as important for 
assessing potential online offender’ risks of attacking specific 
organizations. However, in contrast to past research that listed 
these goals as motivations, we follow the rationale proposed in 
the criminological literature, and classify this list of desires as 
cyber-criminals goals.  
V. CONCRETE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS TO DRAW FROM THE 
DSK-RAMG MODEL  
     The growing number of online offenders who are willing 
and capable of launching significant cyber-dependent crimes 
against organizations, obligates information technology 
officers to adopt security measures that aim to identify likely 
threats, harden their organization against likely attack vectors, 
and replicate the security measures used in a fortress model 
for protecting a physical space [47-48]. Fortress computing 
environments, which are commonly adopted by major 
governmental agencies and large financial and industrial 
organizations, are computing environments within which 
substantial control is enforced on users’ access to the 
computer network [49]. In line with the value placed in the 
model-based approach for describing, analyzing and 
identifying cyber-risk, we posit that similarly to Parker’s [14] 
and Jones’s [50] models, our proposed model could be 
employed for assessing online offenders’ potential threat to an 
organization [15]. However, due to the emphasis placed on 
situational motivation in the DSK-RAMG model, we propose 
that this model may be used for predicting the occurrence of 
cyber-dependent crimes. Specifically, we suggest that the 
intersection of attackers’ personal traits, skills, knowledge, 
resources, authority and situational motivation level to offend 
could be effective in assessing online offenders’ threat and 
predicting the risk that a cyber-dependent crime will develop.    
Indeed, the underlying premise behind Parker’s [14] 
SKRAM model is similar to the aforementioned proposition. 
However, in contrast to Parker’s focus in a unidimensional 
state in which heightened online offender’s SKRAM poses a 
greater threat to a target, we propose that fluctuations in online 
offenders’ DSK-RAMG components over time, results in 
variation in targets’ vulnerability to a potential cyber attack. 
Specifically, as indicated in Figure 1, with the exception of 
two demographic traits which tend to remain constant over 
time (i.e. gender and race), the   magnitude and direction of all 
the DSK-RAMG model’s components could increase at some 
times, decrease in other times, and yet remain unchanged and 
stagnate in other occasions. Consider for instance the case of  
cyber-warrior and their motivation to engage in cyber-attacks 
during times of political and military tensions vs during time 
of piece. Indeed, in times of war the situational motivation of 
cyber warriors to launch cyber-attacks against rival countries’ 
targets will be significantly higher than the situational 
motivation during peaceful times. Similarly, hacktivists’ 
motivations to launch cyber-attacks will be higher in times in 
which the group is trying to push a political agenda than 
during times they are not. Consequently, the potential levels of 
threat to targets fluctuates over time and can differ across 
times of day, week and even month.      
 
 
Since the motivation to launch a cyber-dependent crime is 
originated in the environment (both offline and online) and 
could be triggered by unique set of circumstances, we suspect 
that it is important to identify situations conducive to cyber-
dependent crimes, flag their potential influence on different 
threat agents, and generate predictions regarding the 
likelihood of these situations to result in specific types of 
attacks against unique organizations. Moreover, we suspect 
that the timing in which situations conducive to cyber-
dependent crime emerge, may support predictions of the time 
frame in which cyber-dependent crimes will occur. Thus, we 
adopt Cohen and Felson’s[51] assumption that a successful 
criminal event requires the convergence in space and time of 
motivated offender, suitable target and the absence of capable 
guardian, and suspect that the timing in which a cyber-
dependent crime will be launched against a target 
organization is a function of the culmination of the various 
DSK-RAMG model components into a tipping point.  
.  
 
VI. CONDUCIVE  ENVIRONMENTS FOR THE COLLECTION OF 
ATTACKERS’ DSK-RAMPG CUES 
Reflecting upon potential ways to apply our claims in the 
context of organizational security practices, one may suggest 
the potential utility of IDSs and IPSs for predicting cyber-
dependent crimes and monitoring their development. 
However, traditional IDSs and IPSs primarily focus on 
detection of malicious activity as or after it happens [52-53]. 
Similarly, one may point out the availability of current 
approaches for event based predictions, such as the rule-
based (which are merely expert generate rules [54]), case-
based (which do not include mechanism for   
discovering temporal correlations), Finite State Machine 
based (which are rarely available in situations where human 
actions have significant impact), Model- based (which are 
rarely applicable in cyber domains), and Probabilistic (in 
which exact inference is intractable) approaches [55-57]. 
Unfortunately, these approaches draw on problematic (and 
sometime unrealistic) assumptions and methodologies.  
Therefore, we suspect that there is a need to develop new 
security tools that will collect online and offline cues for the 
potential development of situations conducive to cyber-
dependent crimes, and generate predictions regarding the 
occurrence, timing and later stages of an attacks. Such tools 
should pick cues for the potential increase in situational 
motivations to launch cyber-dependent crimes from online 
environments (for instance hackers’ forums and social media 
sites like Twitter and Facebook which were already proved 
useful in forecasting flue epidemics [58], and online threats 
like spam [59]), and use these cues to generate probabilities for 
the development and progression of cyber-dependent crime 
events. We believe that the design of these tools should also 
draw on recent successful attempts to assess social media 
users’ demographic and personality traits using data from the 
online environment [60,61]. Indeed, McCormick and 
colleagues [60] have already demonstrated that demographic 
information could be easily collected from Twitter users’ 
accounts by simply viewing users’ profile pictures and 
webpage page, and assessing users’ attributes like gender, age, 
and race. Similar approach could be taken when colleting data 
from Facebook’s users. Moreover, Sumner and associates [61] 
showed that Twitter users’ profile attributes and use of 
language could be indicative of personality traits that are 
associated with the  Dark Tried personality (i.e. psychopathy, 
narcissism and Machiavellianism) and with the Big Five 
Personality Traits (i.e. extraversion, agreeableness, openness, 
conscientiousness and neuroticism). Building abilities for data 
collection and assessment, could improve organizations’ 
security posture and their effectiveness in preventing and 
mitigating cyber attacks .   
VII. CONCLUSIONS  
Our proposed model is designed to revise and elaborate the 
personal and situational circumstances that influence a threat 
agent’s probability to launch a cyber-dependent crime incident 
against target organizations. In addition to emphasizing threat 
agents’ skills, knowledge, resources, authority, and motivation, 
our model emphasizes the important contribution of attackers’ 
personal attributes and goals for initiating cyber-dependent 
crimes. Moreover, acknowledging that the motivation to offend 
comes both from within and from the environment, we suggest 
that cyber-dependent crimes are more likely to occur with the 
culmination of the various DSK-RAMG model components 
into a tipping point. Drawing on this model, we suspect that 
efforts should be made to build security tools that allow the 
predictions of both the target and time of cyber-dependent 
crimes.  
REFERENCES 
[1] Tanenbaum, A.S. (2003). Computer Networks (4th edition). NJ: Prentice 
Hall.  
[2] Fritzon, A., Ljungkvist, K., Boin, A., and Rhinard, M. (2007). 
“Protecting Europe’s Critical Infrastructures: Problems and Prospects.” 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 15:30-41.  
[3]  Furnell, S. (2002). Cybercrime: Vandalizing the Information Society. 
Boston, MA: Addison- Wesley. 
[4] Furnell, S., Emm, D., & Papadaki, M. (2015). The challenge of 
measuring cyber-dependent crimes. Computer Fraud & Security, (10), 
5-12. 
[5] Rantala, R. R. (2008). Cybercrime against businesses, 2005. 
organization, 15(14), 9. 
[6] RSA (2016). 2016: Current state of cybercrime. Available at: 
https://www.rsa.com/content/dam/rsa/PDF/2016/05/2016-current-state-
of-cybercrime.pdf 
[7] Norton. (2016). Norton Cyber Security Insight Report. Available at: 
https://us.norton.com/norton-cybersecurity-insights-report-global 
[8] Mcafee. (2014).  Net Losses: Estimating the Global Costs of 
Cybercrime. Available at 
https://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-economic-impact-
cybercrime2.pdf 
[9] Mackey, D. (2003). Web Security for Network and System 
Administrators. Cengage Learning.  
[10] Sabillon, R. ., Cano, J., Cavaller, V., & Serra, J. (2016). Cybercrime and 
Cybercriminals: A Comprehensive Study. International Journal of 
Computer Networks and Communications Security, 4(6), 165-176. 
[11] Landreth, B. (1985). Out of the Inner Circle: a Hacker’s Guide to 
Computer Security. Microsoft Press.  
[12] Chantler, N. (1996). Profile of a computer hacker. Florida: infowar. 
[13] Seebruck, R. (2015). A typology of hackers: Classifying cyber 
malfeasance using a weighted arc circumplex model. Digital 
Investigation, 14, 36-45. 
[14] Parker, D. B. (1998). Fighting Computer Crime: A New Framework for 
Protecting Information. New York: John Wiley & Sons 
[15] McQuade, S C. (2006). Understanding and Managing Cybercrime. 
Pearson Education INC 
[16] Caspi, A., Moffitt, T. E., Silva, P. A., Stouthamer‐Loeber, M. A. G. D. 
A., Krueger, R. F., & Schmutte, P. S. (1994). Are some people 
crime‐prone? Replications of the personality‐crime relationship across 
countries, genders, races, and methods. Criminology, 32(2), 163-196. 
[17] Krueger, R. F., Schmutte, P. S., Caspi, A., Moffitt, T. E., Campbell, K., 
& Silva, P. A. (1994). Personality traits are linked to crime among men 
and women: Evidence from a birth cohort. Journal of abnormal 
psychology, 103(2), 328. 
[18] Hald, Sara LN, and Jens M. Pedersen. (2012)."An updated taxonomy for 
characterizing hackers according to their threat properties." In Advanced 
Communication Technology (ICACT), 14th International Conference 
on, pp. 81-86. IEEE. 
[19] Sykes, J. B. (1981). The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Clarendon Press. 
[20] Sutherland, E. H. (1942). Development of the theory. Edwin Sutherland 
on analyzing crime, 30-41. 
[21] Nagin, D. S., & Paternoster, R. (1993). Enduring individual differences 
and rational choice theories of crime. Law and Society Review, 467-496. 
[22] Briar, S., & Piliavin, I. (1965). Delinquency, situational inducements, 
and commitment to conformity. Soc. Probs., 13, 35. 
[23] Akers, R. L. (1985). Deviant behavior: A social learning approach. 
Wadsworth Publishing Company. 
[24] Paternoster, R. (1987). The deterrent effect of the perceived certainty 
and severity of punishment: A review of the evidence and issues. Justice 
Quarterly, 4(2), 173-217. 
[25] Gottfredson, M. R., & Hirschi, T. (1990). A general theory of crime. 
Stanford University Press. 
[26] Agnew, R. (1992). Foundation for a general strain theory of crime and 
delinquency. Criminology, 30(1), 47-88. 
[27] Ross, L., & LaFree, G. (1986). Deterrence in criminology and social 
policy. Behavioral and social science: Fifty years of discovery. 
[28] Bentham, J. (1970 [1789a]). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation, ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart. London: Athlone Press 
[29] Clarke, R & Cornish, D .(1985). "Modelling offenders' decisions: a 
framework for research and policy." Pp. 147-85 in M. Tonry and N. 
Morris (eds.), Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research, 
Volume 6. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
[30] Copes, H., & Vieraitis, L. M. (2009). Bounded rationality of identity 
thieves: Using offender‐based research to inform policy. Criminology & 
Public Policy, 8(2), 237-262. 
[31] Maimon, D., Alper, M., Sobesto, B., & Cukier, M. (2014). Restrictive 
deterrent effects of a warning banner in an attacked computer 
system. Criminology, 52(1), 33-59. 
[32] Wilson, T., Maimon, D., Sobesto, B., & Cukier, M. (2015). The Effect 
of a Surveillance Banner in an Attacked Computer System: Additional 
Evidence for the Relevance of Restrictive Deterrence in 
Cyberspace. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 52(6), 
829-855. 
[33] Testa, A., Maimon, D., Sobesto, B. & Cukier M. (2017). Illegal 
Roaming and File Manipulation on Target Computers Assessing the 
Effect of Sanction Threats on System Trespassers’ Online Behaviors. 
Criminology and Public Policy.  
[34]  Agnew, R. (2002). Experienced, vicarious, and anticipated strain: An 
exploratory study on physical victimization and delinquency. Justice 
Quarterly, 19(4), 603-632. 
[35] Schell, B. H., & Dodge, J. L. (2002). The hacking of America: Who's 
doing it, why, and how. Greenwood Publishing Group Inc.. 
[36]  Bossler, A.  M., & Burruss, G. W. (2011). The general theory of crime 
and computer hacking: Low self-control hackers. Corporate hacking 
and technology-driven crime: Social dynamics and implications, 38-67. 
[37]  Clarke, R.V. (1995). Situational Crime Prevention. In Crime and 
Justice: A Review of Research, Vol. 19, 91-150 
[38] Jordan, T. &  Taylor, P. (1998)."A sociology of hackers." The 
Sociological Review 46, no. 4: 757-780. 
[39] Wentworth, E. (2002). Theories of Hacker Psychological Motivations 
and Profiles. available online at www. cs. ucf. edu/ courses/ cgs5132/ 
spring2002/ presentation/ wentworth. ppt. 
[40] Young, R., Zhang, L., & Prybutok, V. R. (2007). Hacking into the minds 
of hackers. Information Systems Management, 24(4), 281-287. 
[41] Paternoster, R., & Pogarsky, G. (2009). Rational choice, agency and 
thoughtfully reflective decision making: The short and long-term 
consequences of making good choices. Journal of Quantitative 
Criminology, 25(2), 103-127. 
[42] Cornish D, & Clarke, RV. (2003). Opportunities, Precipitators and 
Criminal Decisions: A Reply to Wortley's Critique of Situational Crime 
Prevention. In: Smith M, Cornish D, editors. Theory for Practice in 
Situational Crime Prevention, Crime Prevention Studies. Vol. 16. 
Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 41-96. 
[43] Maimon, D., Wilson, T., Ren, W., & Berenblum, T. (2015). On the 
relevance of spatial and temporal dimensions in assessing computer 
susceptibility to system trespassing incidents. British Journal of 
Criminology, azu104. 
[44] Willison, R & Siponen, M. (2009) Overcoming the insider: reducing 
employee crime through Situational Crime Prevention. Communications 
of the ACM, 52 (9). pp. 133-137.  
[45] Hutchings, A., & Holt, T. J. (2014). A crime script analysis of the online 
stolen data market. British Journal of Criminology, azu106. 
[46] Kenney, M. (2015). Cyber-terrorism in a post-stuxnet world. Orbis, 
59(1), 111-128. 
[47] Nosworthy, J. D. (2000). "A Practical Risk Analysis Approach: 
managing BCM risk."Computers & Security 19 (7): 596-614. 
[48] Tregear, J. (2001). "Risk Assessment." Information Security Technical 
Report 6 (3): 19-27. 
[49] Scully, T. (2011). The cyber threat, trophy information and the fortress 
mentality. Journal of business continuity & emergency planning, 5(3), 
195-207. 
[50] Jones, A. (2002). Identification of a Method for the Calculation of the 
Capability of Threat Agents in an Information Environment. School of 
Computing. Pontypridd, University of Glamorgan:  0-134 
[51] Cohen, L.E. and Felson, M. (1979). Social Change and Crime Rate 
Trends: A Routine Activity Approach. American Sociological Review 
44: 588-608. 
[52] Scarfone, K.Mell, P. (2007). "Guide to Intrusion Detection and Preventi
on Systems (IDPS)". Computer_Security Resource Center (National Insi
tute of Standards and Technology) (800–94). 
[53] Valeur, F., Vigna, G., Kruegel, C., & Kemmerer, R. A. (2004). 
Comprehensive approach to intrusion detection alert correlation. IEEE 
Transactions on dependable and secure computing, 1(3), 146-169. 
[54] Müller, A., Göldi, C., Tellenbach, B., Plattner, B., & Lampart, S. (2009). 
Event correlation engine. Department of Information Technology and 
Electrical Engineering-Master’s Thesis, Eidgenössische Technische 
Hochschule Zürich. 
[55]  Valdes, A., & Skinner, K. (2001). Probabilistic alert correlation. In 
Recent advances in intrusion detection (pp. 54-68). Springer 
Berlin/Heidelberg. 
[56] Steinder, M., &.Sethi, A. S. (2004).Probabilistic fault diagnosis in comm
unication systems through incremental_hypothesis updating. Computer 
Networks 45, 4, 537-562. 
[57] Steinder, M., &,Sethi, A. S. (2004).A survey of fault localization 
techniques in computer networks. Science of Computer Programming 
53, 2, 165-194. 
[58] Achrekar, H., Gandhe, A., Lzarus, R., Yu, S.-H., & Liu, B. (2011) 
Predicting flu trends using twitter data. In Conferenceon 
Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS),   IEEE, 
pp. 702–707. 
[59] Thomas, K., Li, F., Grier, C., & Paxson, V. (2014). Consequences of 
connectivity: Characterizing account hijacking on twitter. In 
Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security (pp. 489-500). ACM. 
[60] McCormick, T. H., Lee, H., Cesare, N., Shojaie, A., & Spiro, E. S. 
(2017). Using Twitter for demographic and social science research: tools 
for data collection and processing. Sociological Methods & 
Research, 46(3), 390-421. 
[61] Sumner, C., Byers, A., Boochever, R., & Park, G. J. (2012, December). 
Predicting dark triad personality traits from twitter usage and a linguistic 
analysis of tweets. In Machine learning and applications (icmla), 2012 
11th international conference on (Vol. 2, pp. 386-393). IEEE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
